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NOTES
A NECESSARY TOOL: THE CONTINUING
DEBATE OVER THE VIABILITY OF





Discrimination against older employees in the American
workplace has long been a common phenomenon.1 Until the
1950s, when many states began to pass laws addressing such
discrimination, older workers in America enjoyed relatively few
protections from employment discrimination. 2 The American
population is increasingly getting older. The baby boomer
generation workers make up almost half of the entire workforce,
and the youngest of them will turn forty in 2006.3 Therefore, in
a few short years this entire group will fall within a protected
class.4 It is clear that, now more than ever, our court systems
and workplaces are on the threshold of a crisis that cannot be
avoided unless the current trend of age discrimination is
abated.5
f J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2001,
Cornell University.
I See generally RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (2001).
2 See id. at 6.
:1 Id. at 10.
4 Id.
5 See id. ("Unless U.S. employers dramatically alter their perception and
treatment of older workers in the workplace, a crisis of unequaled proportions will
confront our court system.").
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Three key pieces of federal legislation offer workers crucial
protections against many forms of employment discrimination:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VIJ),6 the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),7 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).8  Typically, an
employee can use one of two theories to allege employment
discrimination. First, the employee can claim injury under a
disparate treatment theory, meaning that the employer has
clearly treated the employee differently based on a protected
characteristic. 9 Alternatively, an employee can proceed under a
disparate impact theory. To succeed under this theory, the
employee must show that an employment practice, though
neutral on its face, has the effect of discrimination. 10 The "chief
difference" between these two theories is that under the
disparate treatment theory an employee must show that an
employer acted with a discriminatory motive, while under
disparate impact theory no such showing is required. 1 To allege
violations of Title VII or the ADA, employees may bring claims
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). Generally, this statute makes it unlawful for an
employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
7 Id. §§ 12111-12117 (2000). This statute prohibits discrimination by an
employer "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge or employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. § 12112(a).
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
9 Disparate treatment occurs when " '[t]he employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'" Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). To succeed, an
employee must prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive which
" 'can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.'" Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (1977)). Often times,
disparate treatment cases "concern a decision to hire, fire, or promote." EEOC v.
Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984).
10 Disparate impact "results from the use of 'employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another.'" Geller, 635 F.2d at 1031 (quoting Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 336 n.15). Cases brought under a disparate impact theory generally
involve "an employment test or criterion or other general policy." Borden's, 724 F.2d
at 1392.
1I Borden's, 724 F.2d at 1392.
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using either theory.' 2  Under the ADEA, while courts
unanimously recognize an employee's ability to claim disparate
treatment, 1 3 they are split over whether they will allow disparate
impact claims. The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have allowed such disparate impact claims,
while the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
not. 14
The longstanding debate among scholars and the split in the
circuits on the availability of disparate impact claims under the
ADEA continues today.' 5  Part I of this Note reviews the
background of the ADEA and discusses the split among the
circuits on this issue. Part II argues that because Title VII and
the ADEA are similar both in statutory language and purpose,
courts should allow plaintiffs to use a disparate impact theory to
allege discrimination in violation of the ADEA, as they can under
Title VII. Part III contends that the Supreme Court has left this
issue undecided in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins6 and argues
further that disparate impact theory is necessary for employees
who wish to attempt to prove that employment practices based
on valid factors are actually pretextual and motivated by
animus. Finally, Part IV shows that allowing employees to bring
disparate impact claims under the ADEA is in the best interests
of the public and fulfills the true purposes of the Act.
12 Title VII codifies this right, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), and courts have
consistently recognized it. Similarly, the ADA "explicitly includes the [availability
ofl disparate impact theory" in the language of the statute. MACK A. PLAYER ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 605 (2d ed. 1995); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(3)(A), 12112(b)(6).
13 See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S, 604, 609 (1993) ("The
disparate treatment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the language
of the statute makes clear.").
14 See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324-26 (11th Cir. 2001). The
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits have expressed no opinion
on the issue. Id. at 1325 n.5.
15 See id. at 1324-26. Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an
appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision prohibiting the
use of disparate impact theory under the ADEA, Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 534
U.S. 1054 (2001), but later dismissed the writ of certiorari as "improvidently
granted." Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228, 228 (2002).
Ir 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEBATE
A. The Purpose and Legislative History of the ADEA
Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 as a response to the
prevalence of age discrimination throughout the American
workplace.17  The statute's goal was to end arbitrary
discrimination against workers because of their age.' 8 Congress
intended to "promote the employment of older workers based on
their ability" rather than their age 19 and therefore prohibited an
employer from failing or refusing to "hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age." 20
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 originally
contained a provision concerning age discrimination, but it was
deleted before the Act's passage. 22 Title VII instead directed the
17 GREGORY, supra note 1, at 6 ("[I]t was not until 1967 that Congress
recognized that ageism was outdated and irreconcilable with civilized society and
American cultural values.").
18 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000) ("It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.").
Arbitrary discrimination was almost always based on stereotypes that led
employers to believe older workers were stubborn, less productive than younger
workers, and not worth the investment to train to use new technology. GREGORY,
supra note 1, at 24.
19 H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 1 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213,
2214.
20 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Similarly, the ADEA forbids an employer "to limit,
segregate or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's age." Id. § 623(a)(2). The Act
initially did not protect workers over seventy but was amended in 1986 to protect all
workers over forty years old. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (codified as amended in 29
U.S.C. § 631(a), (c)(1)).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
22 GREGORY, supra note 1, at 17. It has been argued that the age discrimination
provision was added to Title VII in order to create dissent in Congress and prevent
its passage. See Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 WIS. L.
REV. 507, 512 n.23 (1995). The "most plausible reason" for the deletion of the
provision was that Congress lacked information about age discrimination that could
provide a sufficient basis for statutory prohibitions. Miles F. Archer, Note, Mullin v.
Raytheon Company: The Threatened Vitality of Disparate Impact Under the ADEA,
52 ME. L. REV. 149, 151 n.12 (2000).
[Vol.77:649
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Secretary of Labor to conduct a study of the reasons or factors
leading to age discrimination and the effect of such
discrimination on the United States. 23 In 1965, Secretary of
Labor W. Willard Wirtz submitted a report to Congress 24 that
found that many employers imposed age limits when hiring new
employees and that employers generally premised these limits
on stereotypical assumptions about older workers.25  The
Secretary recommended action be taken "to eliminate arbitrary
age discrimination in employment."26  Accordingly, Congress
confirmed Secretary Wirtz's findings27 and passed the ADEA.28
In its final form the statute prohibited, with some exceptions, an
employer from using age as a factor in employment decisions,
practices, and policies.29 The most notable statutory exception
allowed employers to escape liability by proving that an
employment decision was based on "reasonable factors other
than age."30
23 Archer, supra note 22, at 151. The study was part of a Congressional
compromise to satisfy those who wanted to include age provisions in Title VII but
realized that doing so would hinder its chance of passage. Marla Ziegler, Note,
Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68
MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1053 (1984).
24 U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American Worker; Age Discrimination in
Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress Under § 715 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (1965).
25 GREGORY, supra note 1, at 17.
26 H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 1 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213,
2214. The report recommended action to prohibit arbitrary discrimination, while
suggesting that "factors which 'affect older workers' be addressed through
programmatic measures to improve opportunities for older workers"-a distinction
that some courts emphasize. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008
(10th Cir. 1996); see infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
27 Jennifer J. Clemons & Richard A. Bales, ADEA Disparate Impact in the Sixth
Circuit, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226, 230-31 (1983).
28 It has been argued that because the ADEA was, in essence, born from Title
VII, it was intended to be an extension of Title VII protections. See Ziegler, supra
note 23, at 1055 (asserting Congress intended "that the two Acts were not
conflicting, but complementary").
29 See Archer, supra note 22, at 153 (noting Congress did not place a "blanket
ban" on such decisions).
30 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). An employer can also avoid liability under the
statute by showing that "age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business," id., or that the
employer is observing the "terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended
to evade the purposes of this chapter." Id. § 623(f)(2)(A). Additionally, an employer
does not violate the statute by discharging or disciplining an employee for good
cause. Id. § 623(f)(3).
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B. Disparate Treatment Theory Under the ADEA
. Disparate treatment is "the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion[,]" or
any other protected trait.31 The most important element that a
plaintiff must prove is that the discrimination was intentional. 32
A plaintiff can do this by either establishing an employer's
unlawful pattern or practice or by showing mixed-motives on the
part of the employer Courts unanimously agree that a plaintiff
can bring either type of disparate treatment claim under the
ADEA. 33
31 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)).
32 See id.; Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 955 (8th Cir. 2001)
("The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim
of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination.").
33 See, e.g., Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610; Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696,
699 (1st Cir. 1999); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1474 (9th
Cir. 1995).
There are two additional ways a plaintiff can bring a disparate treatment claim.
First, the plaintiff can allege that an unlawful pattern or practice of age
discrimination exists. Adams v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 422 (7th Cir.
2000). In order to succeed, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that discrimination "was the company's standard operating procedure-the
regular rather than the unusual practice." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336. After a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut
the presumption of discrimination. Id. at 360; see also Archer, supra note 22, at 155
(noting that the employer has the burden of producing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions). Courts have generally allowed plaintiffs to
establish disparate treatment under the ADEA using a pattern or practice theory.
See, e.g., King v. Gen. Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. W.
Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1016 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Sandia Co., 639 F.2d 600,
621-22 (10th Cir. 1980). Another type of disparate treatment claim is a "mixed-
motives" case in which the plaintiff argues that the employer considered a protected
characteristic in addition to other legitimate reasons while making an employment
decision. Archer, supra note 22, at 156. The Supreme Court, which developed this
theory using a Title VII case, held that the employer must prove "by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it
had not taken the plaintiffs gender into account." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 258 (1989). As a response to this, in 1991 Congress amended Title VII to
hold an employer liable when partially basing an employment decision on a
discriminatory factor, even if he could show that he would have made the same
decision if he had considered legitimate factors alone. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000);
see also Archer, supra note 22, at 156 n. 56; PLAYER ET AL., supra note 12, at 213.
The mixed motives analysis has been applied to cases arising under the ADEA. See,
e.g., Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171, 180-84 (2d Cir. 1992). It is
unclear whether the 1991 amendments to Title VII should be adopted by analogy by
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The primary way for a plaintiff to prove disparate treatment
is with a direct showing that an employer's practice or policy was
discriminatory on its face. 34 Alternatively, if a plaintiff has only
circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment, she can still
succeed under the "indirect, burden shifting approach"3 set out
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.36 Under this theory, a
plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
37
a prima facie case of age discrimination, 38 thereby creating a
presumption that the employer has unlawfully discriminated
against the employee. 39 The burden then shifts to the employer
to "offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its
employment decision."40 If the employer meets this burden, 41 the
presumption of discrimination disappears, 42 and the plaintiff
must prove that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual.
43
courts under the ADEA framework or whether courts should apply the Price
Waterhouse standard to mixed-motives cases under the ADEA. See Archer, supra
note 22, at 156 n.56; PLAYER ET AL., supra note 12, at 634.
34 See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610; Rummery v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 250 F.3d
553, 556 (7th Cir. 2001). Once such a facial treatment is demonstrated, a plaintiff
need not prove the employer held a particular "animus or ill will toward older
people." EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984).
35 Rummery, 250 F.3d at 556.
36 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Although originally developed in a Title VII
context, courts apply this approach to ADEA cases as well. See, e.g., Ellis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996).
37 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
38 There are generally two different ways in which courts allow a plaintiff to
prove a prima facie case. See PLAYER ET AL. note 12, at 203-04. Most courts require
that the plaintiff show that (1) she was discharged; (2) she was qualified for the
position or performing satisfactorily; and (3) she was a member of the protected
group, i.e. forty or older. See Rummery, 250 F.3d at 556; Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1004;
Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1995). Some courts
also require plaintiff to show that "substantially younger, similarly situated
employees were treated more favorably," Rummery, 250 F.3d at 556, while other
courts require the plaintiff to prove not only that the replacement was younger but
also that the replacement was outside the protected class, i.e. under forty. PLAYER
ET AL., supra note 12, at 204; see also Armendariz, 58 F.3d at 149.
39 Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
40 Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 1997).
41 This burden is a burden of production only. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. The
burden of persuasion as to the employer's intentional discrimination "remains at all
times with the plaintiff." Id. at 253. Additionally, the employer must "frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id. at 255-56.
42 See id. at 255 n.10; Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 958 (8th
Cir. 2001).
43 Rummery, 250 F.3d at 556. For example, in Rummery, the plaintiff was
discharged as part of a reduction in force. Id. at 554-55. Although plaintiff had
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The Supreme Court has held that if a plaintiff with a
disparate treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence
shows that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
was not truthful, this "may, together with the elements of a
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. '" 44 In
other words, even if the plaintiff proves that the employer's
stated reasons for the employment decision were untruthful, a
fact-finder may still require more before finding that the
employer intentionally discriminated. 45 This position is a recent
change from what courts had previously considered sufficient to
constitute pretext. 46 Some argue that this scheme makes it very
received poor evaluations, he sought to prove that this otherwise legitimate reason
was pretextual. Id. at 557-60. The court stated that one way plaintiff could prove
pretext was to show that the employer did not believe its own evaluation that
plaintiff was doing substandard work. Id. at 557. Often plaintiffs will try to prove
pretext through the use of statistics. See Evers, 241 F.3d at 958 (summarizing
statistical evidence purporting to show that a majority of those laid off by the
employer were over forty and therefore pretext was established). Courts, however,
have noted that standing alone, statistics cannot establish disparate treatment. See
Rummery, 250 F.3d at 559.
44 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (emphasis added).
45 Thus, a fact finder's rejection of the employer's proffered reasons will permit,
but not compel, a finding of intentional discrimination. See id. The Supreme Court
reasoned that it could only impose liability on an employer who actually
discriminated. See id. at 514-15. The Court stated further that it did not equate
proof of untruthfulness with proof of unlawful discrimination unless the burden on
the plaintiff to establish her prima facie case was "a degree of proof so high that it
would, in absence of rebuttal, require a directed verdict for the plaintiff' and
because a plaintiffs prima facie burden simply was not this high, this could not be
so. Id. at 515. The dissent characterized this view of the pretext requirement as
"exempting [employers] from responsibility for [their] lies." Id. at 537 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The majority in Hicks, however, dismissed that view by noting that
some employers would surely lie about their motivations for their employment
decisions but that "Title VII is not a cause of action for perjury." Id. at 521.
46 Before Hicks, three competing theories on what constituted pretext had
emerged in the federal courts. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120,
1122 (7th Cir. 1994). First, the "pretext-only" rule stated that if a plaintiff showed
that the reasons given by the employer relating to the employment decision were
false, "then she is automatically entitled to a judgment in her favor." Id. Second, the
"pretext-plus" rule required the plaintiff to show both "that the employer's reasons
[were] false and direct evidence that the employer's real reasons were
discriminatory." Id. at 1123. Finally, some courts, including the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, adopted an intermediary rule which permitted but did not
compel a fact-finder to infer that the employer had intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff upon a showing that the employer's proffered reasons were
false. See, e.g., id. at 1122-23.
It is clear that in Hicks, the Supreme Court rejected the "pretext-only rule," but
it is not as clear which of the remaining two theories the Court adopted. Id. at 1123.
The dissent in Hicks pointed out that the majority gave conflicting signals; some
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difficult for plaintiffs who lack direct evidence of intentional
discrimination to prevail. 47
C. Disparate Impact Theory Under the ADEA
A disparate impact "occurs when an employment practice or
decision that appears on its face to be nondiscriminatory falls
more harshly upon" employees within a protected group than on
employees outside the protected group. 48 The Supreme Court
first conceptualized disparate impact theory in 1971 in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 49 The Court noted that "practices, procedures,
language implied that falsity of the proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to
find intentional discrimination, while other language suggested "that proof of the
falsity of the employer's articulated reasons will not even be sufficient to sustain
judgment for the plaintiff." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting). At least
one circuit has chosen to ignore this apparent conflict and read Hicks as permitting,
but not compelling, judgment for the plaintiff if she proves the employer's proffered
reasons are false. See Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123-24, 1124 n.3. Currently, the
circuits are split on this issue. Archer, supra note 22, at 156 n.52.
47 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The majority's scheme
greatly disfavors Title VII plaintiffs without the good luck to have direct evidence of
discriminatory intent."); GREGORY, supra note 1, at 207 ("The Hicks decision greatly
disfavors the worker who has no direct evidence of discrimination to present to the
court.").
48 GREGORY, supra note 1, at 158; see also EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers and
Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (defining an employment practice
with a disparate impact as one that is facially neutral but actually affects one group
more harshly than another). One case that serves as a prime example of disparate
impact in an age discrimination context is Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d
Cir. 1980). GREGORY, supra note 1, 158-59. In Geller, the fifty-five year old plaintiff
who had "considerable experience as a tenured teacher" was interviewed and hired
to fill a position in an elementary school. See Geller, 635 F.2d at 1030. Ten days
after the plaintiff began work, she was replaced by a twenty-five year old woman,
ostensibly as part of a "cost-cutting policy" which required recruitment, whenever
possible, of teachers who had less than five years work experience and could
therefore be paid at lower levels. See id. Plaintiff introduced statistics at trial which
proved that almost 93% of teachers in the state who were members of the protected
group, aged forty to sixty-five, had more than five years experience, while only 62%
of teachers under forty taught for that long. See id. Therefore, considering the
school's cost cutting policy, younger applicants had a greater chance of being hired
than did applicants in the protected group. The trial judge found, and the Second
Circuit affirmed, that a disparate impact existed. See id.
49 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In that case, the employer openly discriminated based
on race until July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII. Id. at 426-27.
Subsequently, all overt discrimination ceased and the employer adopted a policy
that required either a high school diploma or a certain test score as a prerequisite
for applying for a position in one of the higher paying departments. See id. at 427-
28. It was determined that both of these requirements had the effect of disqualifying
black workers for these positions at a significantly higher rate than white workers.
Id. at 426.
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or tests neutral on their face... cannot be maintained" if they
have the effect of discrimination in the workplace.50
In order to succeed with a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case: She must show that an
employer's policy or practice, while neutral on its face, has the
effect of discriminating against a protected class and prove
causation.5 1 Often a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by
using statistics. 52 While a plaintiff is not required to prove that
the employer intended to discriminate, 53 she must be sure to
identify a specific employment practice that is causing the
disparate impact, 54 and she may be required to demonstrate that
the impact is affecting the entire protected group. 55
50 Id. at 430. The Court reasoned that Title VII prohibited both overt
discrimination as well as "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation." Id. at 431.
51 See Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir.
1997); Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032.
52 For example, statistics are frequently used to create an inference that an
employer's hiring criteria led to employment of more individuals outside the
protected group (aged forty or younger). See, e.g., Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032-33. Such
statistics must show a disparity so substantial that it is sufficient to warrant an
"inference of causation." Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999).
A court will usually deem a disparity sufficiently substantial using one of three
methods. First, it could utilize the "four-fifths" rule. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4D (1998)). If employer records show a selection rate for any protected group
that is less than four-fifths of the highest rate for a group there will be evidence of
disparate impact. See id. Alternatively, courts will consider whether a disparity is
sufficiently "significant." Id. A result is statistically significant if one can conclude
that the result in question, such as a disparate impact on a protected group, is so
improbable to occur by chance that it is unlikely to have happened in this case by
chance alone. See PLAYER ET AL., supra note 12, at 236.
Finally, some courts use multiple regression as a statistical tool to determine if
disparate impact was present. PLAYER ET AL., supra note 12, at 270. This method
determines whether one independent variable, for example, a protected
characteristic, has an influence on a dependent variable, such as salary. PLAYER ET
AL., supra note 12, at 270.
There is not one rule that courts use all the time-the "substantiality of a
disparity is judged on a case-by-case basis." Xerox, 196 F.3d at 366. Sometimes,
statistical evidence can lead to such an "indisputable result" that a trial judge may
be "justified in taking the evaluation of the statistics away from the jury." Geller,
635 F.2d at 1034.
53 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (noting that although the employer demonstrated
a lack of discriminatory intent, the Court would focus on "the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation"); see also Evers v. Alliant
Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2001).
54 Evers, 241 F.3d at 953.
55 Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997). In Criley, the
plaintiff alleged that the employer's hiring plan had a disparate impact on
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Once the plaintiff has successfully demonstrated her prima
facie case, the employer has the opportunity to assert the
business necessity defense. The employer must show "that the
employment practice is justified by business necessity or need
and is related to successful performance of the job for which the
practice is used."56 Generally, the employer has only a burden of
production while the plaintiff maintains the burden of
persuasion; however, this is uncertain because of the business
necessity defense.5 7  If the employer successfully meets this
burden, the plaintiff can still succeed by demonstrating that a
"comparably effective alternative practice would produce a
significantly smaller adverse impact on the protected class."58
employees who were fifty-five years old and older. Id. The court pointed out that
because 94% of the employees the employer hired were forty and older, there was no
negative effect on the entire protected group. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs claim
failed. See id; infra note 145.
5G Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032. The Supreme Court noted that the "touchstone" of
the employer's defense is business necessity. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Therefore, if
the employment practice in question "cannot be shown to be related to job
performance" it is prohibited. Id.
57 Before the Supreme Court decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989), the normal procedure stated that once the plaintiff established her
prima facie case the burden shifted to the employer to prove the business necessity
defense. Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1994). In Wards Cove
Packing, the Supreme Court modified this rule and required the employer only to
produce "evidence of a business justification" for the employment practice in
question while the plaintiff retained the burden of persuasion. Wards Cove Packing,
490 U.S. at 659. In 1991, amendments to Title VII reversed the Wards Cove Packing
standard and "shifted... to the employer the burden to prove job relatedness and
business necessity." PLAYER ET AL., supra note 12, at 627. These amendments were
not made to the ADEA, so a question arose: Which standard applies to the
employer's burden of proof in disparate impact cases under the ADEA? Id. An
example of the confusion surrounding this issue can be seen in the Eighth Circuit.
In 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Wards Cove
Packing standard applied to such cases. See Houghton, 38 F.3d at 958-59. In 1996,
however, the Eighth Circuit noted that it had never considered whether the 1991
amendments to Title VII affected the employer's burden of proof in an ADEA
disparate impact case. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir.
1996). The court assumed without deciding that the pre-Wards Cove Packing
standard would apply. See id.
58 Evers, 241 F.3d at 954; Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032. The plaintiff is said to have
proved pretext if the plaintiff can demonstrate "that another practice would achieve
the same result at comparable cost without causing a disparate impact." See Smith
v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999).
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D. The Circuit Split on the Issue of Allowing Disparate Impact
Theory Under the ADEA
1. Reasons for Allowing Disparate Impact Theory
The courts of appeals are divided as to whether a disparate
impact claim is cognizable under the ADEA.59 Courts that allow
disparate impact claims to be brought under the ADEA usually
do so for one of two reasons.60 First, courts have reasoned that
the Supreme Court left the issue open in Hazen Paper,6 1 where it
considered whether an employer who interfered with the vesting
of his employee's pension benefits violated the ADEA.62 The
Court ruled that there was no disparate treatment when an
59 Xerox, 196 F.3d at 367 n.6 ("The viability of the disparate impact theory
under the ADEA is far from settled among the circuits."). The Courts of Appeals for
the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all prohibited or
questioned the use of disparate impact with an ADEA claim. The Second, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have recognized the use of such claims. Adams v. Fla. Power
Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2001). The Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits
have yet to weigh in on the issue. Id. at 1325 n.5. At least three judges in the Fifth
Circuit have clear doubts about the applicability of disparate impact claims under
the ADEA. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 1003-04 (5th Cir. 1996)
(DeMoss, J., dissenting in part). In Rhodes, after noting that the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has yet to decide the issue, Judge DeMoss pointed out that
"other circuits have followed [the] lead" of the Hazen Paper sentiment, which
expressed doubts as to the viability of disparate impact theory under the ADEA." Id.
at 1004. He then opined that his circuit "should follow the Supreme Court's lead in
Hazen Paper and Hicks by recognizing that the standards governing Title VII
liability and ADEA liability are not, and need not, be identical." Id. He concluded by
reasoning that "[tihe world will not come to an end, nor will our system be in peril,
because ADEA plaintiffs face a different and higher burden than Title VII
plaintiffs." Id.
60 Some courts, however, have allowed such claims but not given any rationale
for their decision. See Evers, 241 F.3d at 953 n.7; Houghton, 38 F.3d at 958-59.
61 See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1329 (Barkett, J., specially concurring) ("The Court
in Hazen Paper took great care to say explicitly that that decision should not be
read to address a disparate impact case."); Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d
102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that "the Supreme Court has never decided
whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA"); Lewis
v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that "the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this legal question"); EEOC v. Local 350,
Plumbers and Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that Hazen
Paper "expressly" left the question open).
62 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 608 (1993). The employer hired
Biggins in 1977 and fired him in 1986 when he was sixty-two years old. Id. at 606.
The employer had a pension plan with a ten-year vesting period, and Biggins was
only weeks away from reaching that mark when he was fired. Id. at 607. Biggins
sued claiming his employer had violated the ADEA because his "age had been a
determinative factor in [his employer's] decision to fire him." Id. at 606.
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employer based his employment decision entirely on factors
other than age, even if a correlation can be shown between those
factors and the employee's age. 3 The Court noted, however, that
it had "never decided whether a disparate impact theory of
liability is available under the ADEA."64  Therefore, several
circuits have interpreted this to mean the Supreme Court has
not decided the issue, and therefore they have felt free to follow
their circuit precedents that allow them to recognize disparate
impact claims under such circumstances.65 Even though dicta in
Hazen Paper can be read as casting doubt on the viability of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA, 66 several circuits have
reasoned that the Supreme Court has not yet prohibited claims
under this theory.67
Secondly, courts argue that the ADEA is so similar to Title
VII that the former should be interpreted to also allow disparate
impact claims. Before Hazen Paper, most circuits assumed
without much thought that the ADEA was so similar in purpose
and text to Title V11 that the two should be analyzed the same
way-even allowing disparate impact claims under each.68 With
the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper, "the tectonic
plates shifted" and many courts began to second-guess the blind
63 Id. at 609. The Court noted that an employer "cannot rely on age as a proxy'
for an employee characteristic such as productivity. Id. at 611; GREGORY, supra note
1, at 212. The Court held, however, that when an employer is "wholly motivated by
factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes
disappears." Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611. The Court noted that although an
employee's age may be correlated with his pension status, the two are "analytically
distinct." Id. For example, an employee under age forty, and therefore outside the
protected class, could have worked for an employer for their entire career, while an
older worker could have been hired only recently. Id. Therefore, an employer can
make decisions about pension status without taking account of age and its related
stereotypes. Id. The Court ruled that such prohibited and inaccurate stereotypes did
not figure into this type of decision. Id. at 612. Rather, the employer based the
decision on "an accurate judgment about the employee," namely, that he was "close
to vesting." Id.; see also GREGORY, supra note 1, at 212-13.
64 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
65 See, e.g., Criley, 119 F.3d at 105; Lewis, 114 F.3d at 750.
66 See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
67 See Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 696-97 (9th Cir.
1999) (allowing a claim despite the court's recognition of "the Supreme Court's
intimation that a disparate impact claim might not be viable under the ADEA");
Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996).
68 See EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting the
"similar language, structure, and purpose of Title VII and the ADEA"); Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980).
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application of Title VII policies to the ADEA. 69 Since Hazen,
however, some courts have continued to analyze claims,
including disparate impact claims, identically under the two
statutes.
70
2. Reasons for Prohibiting Disparate Impact Theory
Other circuits offer several reasons for refusing to recognize
disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 71 First, courts state
that textual provisions within the ADEA have the effect of
excluding disparate impact claims.72 One particular section of
the statute on which courts focus allows employers to
differentiate among employees if their decision is based on
"reasonable factors other than age."73  By definition, disparate
impact claims are based on factors that are neutral on their face
and do not deal with age. As such, courts claim that this
69 See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that
Hazen Paper forced lower courts "to rethink the viability of disparate impact
doctrine in the ADEA context").
70 See e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1999). Additionally,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit speculated that Hazen Paper may not
control claims brought under the disparate impact theory when the employer does
not rely on factors that tend to be highly correlated with age. Id. at 367 n.5. In
Xerox, the employer relied on employees' test scores in deciding who to lay off. Id. at
362-63. The Second Circuit suggested a different analysis-namely one treating the
ADEA and Title VII identically-might apply to cases like this and the Hazen Paper
case might control situations where the factor is correlated with age. Id. at 367 n.5.
71 Some courts deciding this issue have neglected to give their reasoning. See
Casteel v. Executive Bd. of Local 703, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 272 F.3d 463, 466 n.4
(7th Cir. 2001); Rummery v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 250 F.3d 553, 559 n.5 (7th Cir. 2001);
Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 2000).
72 See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001)
(analyzing the textual construction of the ADEA).
73 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2000). The subsection in question reads:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization-(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under
subsections ... of this section where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age ....
Id. (emphasis added).
At least one court has focused on a separate section of the ADEA, id. § 623(a), as
proof that the statute does not allow disparate impact claims. See Ellis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996). The court noted that the section
prohibited various forms of discrimination based on age. The court reasoned that
this prohibits only intentional discrimination and it "would be a stretch to read" this
phrase as prohibiting "incidental and unintentional discrimination" which resulted
from facially neutral practices. Id.
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language has the effect of prohibiting disparate impact claims.7 4
A few courts have argued that this provision of the ADEA is
textually similar to section 206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act
(EPA),75 a statute that the Supreme Court has interpreted as
prohibiting claims using disparate impact theory.76
Other courts emphasize the difference in purpose and
legislative history between the ADEA and Title VII as
justifications for disallowing disparate impact claims under the
former.77 For example, some courts argue that while Title VII
seeks to correct a long history of past discriminatory practices in
the employment context, the ADEA purports only to protect
older employees from contemporaneous discrimination. 78
Therefore, this "divergence in purpose" can be a basis for courts
to disallow claims using a disparate impact theory.79
74 See Mullin, 164 F.3d at 701-02. Courts have understood § 623(f)(1) to permit
"employers to utilize factors other than age as grounds for employment-related
decisions that differentially impact members of the protected class." Id. at 702; see
also Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325; EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077
(7th Cir. 1994) (stating that § 623(f)(1) "suggests that decisions which are made for
reasons independent of age but which happen to correlate with age are not
actionable under the ADEA").
75 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The EPA provides in relevant part that, "[n]o
employer... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees ... at a rate less than ... he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex . . . for equal work ... except where such payment is ... based on any
other factor other than sex." Id.
7G6 County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1981). Section
206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of gender
unless such wage differential is "based on any other factor other than sex." 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The Supreme Court held that this language confined "the
application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination."
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170 (citing H.R. REP. No. 88-309, at 3 (1963)). This had the
effect of eliminating the use of disparate impact theory under the EPA. See Mullin,
164 F.3d at 702 (suggesting that disparate impact is not in "the armamentarium of
weapons available to plaintiffs under the Equal Pay Act"). Some courts have
concluded that section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA is so similar in language to section
206(d)(1) of the EPA that disparate impact claims are logically precluded under the
ADEA also. Id.; see also Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325; Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008; Francis W.
Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077.
77 See, e.g., Mullin, 164 F.3d at 701 (reviewing and contrasting goals of ADEA
and Title VII).
78 See id. The First Circuit reasoned that facially neutral practices that
discriminated against workers protected under Title VII countervailed the statute's
purpose of remedying past inequities, and should therefore be prohibited. The court
reasoned that the ADEA, in contrast, sought only to shield workers from intentional
discrimination resulting from stereotypes and that disparate impact theories of
discrimination were not envisioned by the Act's drafters. Id.
79 Id. (noting that because of the different purposes of the statutes, the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Opponents of disparate impact theory also point to two
differences in the legislative histories of Title VII and the
ADEA.80 The report written by the Secretary of Labor, which
served as the impetus for the ADEA, notes the first difference.8'
The report differentiated between "arbitrary discrimination"8 2
and policies that merely "have a disproportionate effect on older
workers." 83 The report went on to recommend that the former,
which courts analogize to disparate treatment, be statutorily
banned, while the latter, disparate impact, be dealt with in a
different manner.84 This distinction, not drawn in Title VII's
legislative history, weighs against the use of disparate impact
theory under the ADEA.8 5
The second difference in legislative history can be found in
Congress's 1991 amendments to both statutes.8 6 Specifically,
Congress amended Title VII to explicitly include a cause of
action recognizing disparate impact theory87 but made no such
amendment to the ADEA even though Congress
reasoning in Griggs which created the disparate impact theory could not apply in an
ADEA context).
80 At least one court has focused on a third difference in denying this cause of
action. The First Circuit reasoned that the Secretary of Labor's report did not find
evidence of prejudice towards older workers. Mullin, 164 F.3d at 702-03; see also
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. The court reasoned that disparate
impact theory was designed "to combat invidious prejudice that is entirely unrelated
to an ability to perform the job." Id. at 703. Therefore, the report's lack of findings of
prejudice suggested that disparate impact theory could not be used in age
discrimination cases. Id.
81 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
82 Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001).
83 Mullin, 164 F.3d at 703.
84 See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325; Mullin, 164 F.3d at 703 (suggesting some
alternative means, including "educational programs and institutional
restructuring"); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996)
(arguing the effect on older workers should be "addressed through programmatic
measures to improve opportunities for older workers").
85 See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325 ("Thus, the history of the ADEA differs from
the legislative history of Title VII, which the Supreme Court in Griggs relied on to
find a cause of action for disparate impact."); Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 ("The ADEA's
stated purposes ... reflect different approaches for intentional or arbitrary
discrimination and the more benign problem of disparate impact.").
86 See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (1991) (amending
Title VII); cf. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) (amending the
ADEA).
8- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000); see Mullin, 164 F.3d at 703 (reviewing the
1991 amendments to Title VII); Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (noting the addition of a
disparate impact cause of action to Title VII).
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contemporaneously amended other portions of the statute.88
Some courts have seen this omission as an expression of
congressional intent to prohibit disparate impact theory causes
of action under the ADEA.89
Additionally, some courts have read language in the
Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper as an indication that
disparate impact causes of action should not be allowed in the
ADEA context.90 These courts focus on the Supreme Court's
statement that "[d]isparate treatment ... captures the essence of
what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA."91  In Hazen
Paper, the Supreme Court prohibited the use of age as a criterion
in employment policies but allowed the use of other factors even
if they correlate with age. Many courts read this to permit
precisely what a disparate impact cause of action seeks to
outlaw. 92 Finally, courts also reason that the strong language in
the concurring opinion to Hazen Paper supports the prohibition
of disparate impact causes of action in the ADEA context. 93 For
these reasons, some courts have refused to entertain disparate
impact claims under the ADEA.94
88 See Mullin, 164 F.3d at 703 (pointing to the absence of a disparate impact
cause of action provision in the ADEA); Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (same).
89 See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (reasoning that Congress "thus signal[ed] its intent
not to provide for a disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA").
90 See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1326; Mullin, 164 F.3d at 700-01; Ellis, 73 F.3d at
1008; DiBiase v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995); Lyon v.
Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker
Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1994).
91 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). Many courts have
relied on this language. See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1326; Mullin, 164 F.3d at 700; Ellis,
73 F.3d at 1008-09; DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732; Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at
1076.
92 See, e.g., Mullin, 164 F.3d at 700-701 (arguing the "inescapable implication"
of the majority's language in Hazen Paper is that disparate impact theory will not
be recognized); DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732-33.
93 See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
"there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact
analysis from Title VII to the ADEA").
94 Additionally, courts have based their decisions to prohibit disparate impact
claims on other courts' refusal to do so. See Mullin, 164 F.3d at 701; Ellis, 73 F.3d at
1009 (noting that after Hazen Paper "there is a clear trend toward concluding that
the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim.").
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II. THE ADEA AND TITLE VII ARE SUFFICIENTLY SIMILAR TO
ALLOW DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER BOTH
Title VII and the ADEA share the same purpose; both
prohibit an employer from failing or refusing to hire or from
discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual
because of a protected characteristic. 95 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the ADEA's prohibitions "were derived in haec
verba from Title VII."96 The substantive provisions of the two
mirror each other,97 and it is these substantive provisions that
are at issue. 98
Many courts focus on the 1991 amendments to Title VII and
the ADEA, namely that Congress added an express provision to
Title VII allowing disparate impact claims and did not add a
parallel provision to the ADEA even though it simultaneously
amended that statute.99  This emphasis is misplaced. It has
been noted that "courts ordinarily should tread slowly in
premising statutory construction on the action (or inaction) of
subsequent Congresses." 10 Furthermore, even though Congress
did not amend the ADEA to expressly allow disparate impact
claims, it did not limit nor prohibit bringing such claims, even
though it had the opportunity to do so. 10
Courts focus on the "reasonable factor other than age"
defense as a difference between Title VII and the ADEA
95 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000).
96 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). There, the Court found the
substantive provisions of the two statutes shared important similarities but noted
that they had "significant differences" in their "remedial and procedural provisions."
Id.
97 EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
98 Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J.,
specially concurring).
99 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
100 Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703 (lst Cir. 1999).
101 See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1328 n.6 (Barkett, J., specially concurring)
("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of
a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change." (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978))); Brett Ira Johnson,
Note, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a Representative
of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the ADEA from Title VII
Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 303, 333 (2000) ("This
silence ... could be seen as acquiescence to the judicial recognition of a disparate
impact cause of action under the ADEA.").
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sufficient to justify prohibiting disparate impact causes of action
under the latter.10 2 The Supreme Court clearly articulated,
however, that if an employer bases a facially neutral
employment practice or policy on a legitimate business purpose,
a disparate impact cause of action cannot survive.10 3 Therefore,
this section of the ADEA should be considered merely "a
statutory description of the business necessity defense"1 04 and
should not be read as outlawing disparate impact claims.10 5 The
EEOC has suggested that this interpretation is a correct reading
of the "'reasonable factors' defense.' 0 6  The EEOC's
interpretative guidelines, which are entitled to judicial
deference, 10 7 state that when an employer claims the "reasonable
factor other than age" defense to a factor that has an "adverse
impact" on the protected group, such a factor "can only be
justified as a business necessity."108
As noted earlier, some courts have argued that the
reasonable factor other than age" language also constitutes a
textual similarity between the ADEA and the EPA and that this
similarly precludes recognition of disparate impact theory under
the former. 10 9 It is the substantive provisions of the statutes,
however, that are at issue. While the ADEA and EPA may share
similar remedial provisions, which are not at issue, they do not
have similar substantive provisions.110 Moreover, even these
remedial provisions have a significant difference. While the EPA
allows wage differentials based on "any other factor other than
sex," the ADEA requires factors to be "reasonable factors other
102 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
103 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 ("The touchstone is
business necessity.").
104 Adams, 255 F.3d at 1327 (Barkett, J., specially concurring); EEOC v.
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J., dissenting)
("[I]t seems clear to me that [section 623(f)(1)] simply codifies the business necessity
defense.").
105 EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) ("It does not preclude the availability of disparate impact liability.").
106 Adams, 255 F.3d at 1328 (Barkett, J., specially concurring); Smith v. City of
Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that an amicus curiae
brief filed by the EEOC "interpreting the ADEA suggest[ed] that the business
necessity defense is the same under Title VII and the ADEA").
107 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34; Adams, 255 F.3d at 1328 (Barkett, J., specially
concurring) (citing Edwards v. Shalala, 64 F.3d 601, 606 (11th Cir. 1995)).
108 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2001).
109 See supra note 74-75 and accompanying text.
110 See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1329.
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than age.""' Therefore, the EPA provides employers with a
broader defense, essentially only prohibiting them from
intentional discrimination. 112 In contrast, the ADEA has a
narrower defense and requires the employer to demonstrate that
the factor on which he relied was reasonable. 113  This
demonstrative requirement could be thought of as the
mechanism by which an employer could defend himself against a
disparate impact claim." 4
Additionally, some argue that the disparate impact theory
was not conceptualized until the Supreme Court's 1971 decision
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 115 and Congress therefore, drafting
the ADEA in the late 1960s, could not have formed any opinion
about disparate impact theory."6  Congress could not have
intended the "reasonable factor other than age" defense to be a
statutory bar against disparate impact claims." 7 Therefore,
there is a strong argument that the "reasonable factor other than
age" defense under the ADEA does not act to prohibit disparate
impact causes of action, but provides an alternate codification of
the business necessity defense.
Finally, disparate impact theory, first developed by the
Supreme Court in Griggs in a Title VII context, 118 was based not
on the statutory language of Title VI i19 but on Congress's
M" Compare 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) with id. § 623(f)(1) (2000) (emphasis
added).
112 Adams, 255 F.3d at 1329 n.7 (Barkett, J., specially concurring) (citing
Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 934 (7th Cir. 2000) ("By providing a broad
exemption from liability under the Equal Pay Act for any employer who can provide
a neutral explanation for a disparity in pay, Congress has effectively targeted
employers who intentionally discriminate against women.")).
113 Id. at 1329.
114 Id. at 1325 n.6. The majority in Adams declined to draw such an inference.
Id.
115 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11G See Brief of Amicus Curiae Cornell University Chapter of the American
Association of University Professors and the National Lawyers Guild in Support of
Petitioners at 23, Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (No.
99-15306) ("Our legislators neither condemned disparate impact nor condoned it
because they did not know about it.").
117 See id. at 21-23. Others have argued that this line of logic works against
proponents of disparate impact theory under the ADEA. Since Congress did not
know about disparate impact theory while drafting the ADEA, it could not possibly
have intended such claims to be cognizable. Johnson, supra note 101, at 326.
118 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
119 The relevant portion of Title VII is "nearly identical" to section 623(a) of the
ADEA. Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
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underlying objectives of the Act. 120 These objectives included the
"removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to
employment" that caused discrimination. 121 This objective is
practically identical to Congress's purpose in enacting the
ADEA.122 Because the Supreme Court in Griggs noted that
Congress sought to "remove barriers that have operated in the
past" to cause discrimination, 23  some have argued that
disparate impact theory is available only under Title VII because
members of the classes protected under that statute have faced
past discrimination, while workers in the ADEA's protected class
have not. 124 The Supreme Court in Griggs, however, never
indicated that other protected classes would have to show
evidence of past discrimination in order to use the disparate
impact theory. 25 In fact, later decisions expanded the use of
disparate impact theory without requiring plaintiffs to prove
their class had suffered a history of discrimination. 126
III. THE SUPREME COURT LEFT THE ISSUE UNDECIDED IN HAZEN
PAPER Co. V. BIGGINS
Hazen Paper was a disparate treatment case, and the
Supreme Court made it clear that it had "never decided whether
a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the
ADEA... and [it] need not do so here."'127 The holding of the
120 Id. at 1007-08 n.13.
121 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
122 "It is therefore the purpose of this chapter... to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment ... " 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000).
123 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
124 Ziegler, supra note 23, at 1056.
125 Johnson, supra note 101, at 340. The Supreme Court in Griggs seems to
have relied on evidence of past racial discrimination as the reason current
differences between the two groups exist. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31; see also
Johnson, supra note 101, at 340. The Supreme Court also noted that in enacting
Title VII, "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practice, not simply the motivation." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. In other
words, the Court chose to focus on the effects of the disparate impact and not the
reasons such an impact existed. See Ziegler, supra note 23, at 1057.
12G See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977) (applying disparate
impact theory to gender discrimination without requiring the plaintiff to show past
discrimination); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-38
(1977) (holding the employer's hiring policy had a disparate impact against black
employees or employees with Spanish surnames).
127 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
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case did not affect the sustainability of disparate impact causes
of action, and many courts have read this atatement literally and
have continued to follow circuit precedent to allow such
claims. 128 Therefore, any doubt that the Supreme Court has cast
on the viability of such claims is pure dicta and should be
considered as such until the Court makes a determination either
way. 129
The Supreme Court clearly left the door open for disparate
impact claims in Hazen Paper. Specifically, the Court noted that
in cases where an employer supposes that a factor, such as
pension status, correlates with age and acts with this belief in
mind, the employer engages in age discrimination.1 30 Therefore,
it can be inferred that a situation with a disproportionate effect
on older workers but little proof of the employer's discriminatory
motive would be an appropriate situation to use disparate
impact theory to prove that the employer supposed such a
correlation and acted with a discriminatory animus. 131 At least
one circuit that has generally prohibited a particular disparate
128 See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001); see
also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
129 See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "even if we believed that Hazen Paper cast doubt on the validity of [plaintiffs
claims], Houghton represents the law of this Circuit, which we follow absent a 'clear
indication' that it has been overruled").
130 The Supreme Court stated in Hazen Paper:
We do not preclude the possibility that an employer who targets employees
with a particular pension status on the assumption that these employees
are likely to be older thereby engages in age discrimination. Pension status
may be a proxy for age, not in the sense that the ADEA makes the two
factors equivalent ... but in the sense that the employer may suppose a
correlation between the two factors and act accordingly.
507 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
131 See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1327 (Barkett, J., specially concurring) ("Disparate
impact claims provide an avenue for members of protected classes to prove that
discrimination occurred in the workplace when proof of motive is difficult or
unavailable."); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court specified a possible
"underlying theory of ADEA liability" and did not make a decision as to the "method
of proof').
So, for example, only disparate impact theory could be used to address a
situation where an employer used salary as a method of terminating older workers
specifically or decided to fire older workers because of their age and their high
salary. Following the Court's rationale in Hazen Paper, however, disparate impact
theory could not be used when the employer decided to terminate employees based
on cost alone and not because of his employees' ages because he could do so without
discriminating. GREGORY, supra note 1, at 213.
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impact claim under the ADEA has also recognized that there are
certain situations where disparate impact could exist.132
Additionally, the Supreme Court expressly did not rule out
the possibility of "dual liability under ERISA and the ADEA
where the decision to fire the employee was motivated both by
the employer's age and by his pension status."133 Likewise, it did
not consider the special case of an employer who fires an
employee to prevent her from collecting a pension that is based
on age rather than years of service. 34 Thus, even if the Supreme
Court seemed doubtful about the viability of disparate impact
claims under the ADEA, it clearly was not willing to place all
situations in which the cause of action might arise in the same
category.
IV. ALLOWING DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS IS IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF PUBLIC POLICY
Eliminating the opportunity for plaintiffs to bring disparate
impact claims under the ADEA has several negative effects. It
allows employers to make employment decisions that are based
on prohibited stereotypes about older workers but use legitimate
factors as a mere a pretext. 35 Such a result is anomalous to the
purpose of the ADEA, which is to prevent employers from basing
employment decisions on prohibited stereotypes about older
workers. 36 When there is little evidence that an employer was
motivated by such stereotypes and thus discriminated against
the plaintiff, the only tool the plaintiff has to redress this
discrimination is to bring a disparate impact claim. 37 In fact, it
132 The Third Circuit was concerned with a "pure disparate impact case" where
the employer's decision is "wholly motivated by factors other than age." DiBiase v.
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1995). Judge McKee was
the only author of the subsection that dealt with disparate theory generally under
the ADEA. Id. at 732 n.17. He made certain to note that his analysis did not
consider "situations in which impact is used to prove intent to discriminate." Id. at
733 n.19.
133 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613.
134 See id.; see also Adams, 255 F.3d at 1330 (Barkett, J., specially concurring).
135 See Francis W Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1081 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("The
basic practical difficulty with the majority's result is that it provides an opportunity
for employers to exclude older applicants from lower-level jobs simply by declaring
the applicants 'overage' (i.e. entitled to earn an excessive salary for the job they
seekD).").
136 See id. at 1078 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
137 See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("[D]isparate impact analysis should be
allowed to proceed to determine whether the refusal to hire did really arise from
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has been argued that the disparate impact theory was
specifically designed to detect the use of such prohibited
stereotypes. 138
When the legislature passed the ADEA, it did so because it
found that older workers were at a disadvantage in the
workplace and that arbitrary discrimination based on age was
harmful not only to individual plaintiffs but also to society as a
whole. 139 Congress's purpose in passing the ADEA was to
encourage the employment of older workers based on their
ability and to prohibit arbitrary discrimination against them
because of their age. 140 Thus, it seems contrary to the legislative
intent behind the ADEA for courts to prohibit a disparate impact
cause of action and allow employers to continue to discriminate
in a manner that Congress sought to prohibit.' 4 ' Furthermore,
prohibiting plaintiffs from bringing claims using disparate
impact theory might actually increase the incidence of
employment discrimination against older workers by
emboldening employers to use legitimate factors as a pretext for
their discriminatorily motivated employment decisions. 142
Those who oppose disparate impact causes of action under
the ADEA point out a possible practical problem: Because age
falls on a continuum and is constantly changing, it will be
extremely difficult to define who is in the protected class. 143
Therefore, comparison groups are not as clear as they are in
cases involving race or gender discrimination. 4 4 For example,
while an employment practice may disparately impact employees
who are age fifty-five and older, it may have no effect whatsoever
on employees between ages forty and fifty-four who are also
stereotypical views of older workers.").
138 See id. at 1080-81 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
139 See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1)-(4) (2000).
140 See id. § 621(b).
141 See Clemons & Bales, supra note 27, at 27-28.
142 See GREGORY, supra note 1, at 219 ("If an employer feels confident that it
can conceal its discriminatory intent, then it is more likely that it will continue to
engage in illegal, discriminatory conduct.").
143 See Clemons & Bales, supra note 27, at 27 (noting that one practical
problem involves imprecisely defined protected groups). This objection was also
raised by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See Ellis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Accordingly, the line defining the class
that is disparately impacted by a challenged policy is an imprecise one ... .
144 Archer, supra note 22, at 172.
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considered part of the class protected under the ADEA. 145 This,
opponents argue, would allow parties to manipulate the line
defining the protected class "to either strengthen or weaken the
impact of a policy on some age group."'146
This practical problem does not justify the total elimination
of disparate impact theory under the ADEA. Courts could follow
the lead of the Second Circuit and adopt a rule that, to succeed
under disparate impact theory, plaintiffs must "allege a
disparate impact on the entire protected group, i.e., workers
aged 40 and over" and not just point to an impact on a subsection
of that group. 147 This would eliminate any possibility that a
party could manipulate data to strengthen or weaken a case. 148
Additionally, it has been argued that disability is also on a
continuum, and the Supreme Court has expressly stated that
any evaluation of a person's status as disabled must be done on a
case-by-case basis.149 Therefore, in the disparate impact context,
defining a protected class based on age should not be more
difficult for courts than defining one on the basis of disability.150
Finally, the fact that age falls along a continuum could actually
help plaintiffs alleging age discrimination because jurors who
have a "natural fear of growing older and... being subjected to
age discrimination themselves" tend to identify with plaintiffs. 151
145 This was the situation in Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102 (2d
Cir. 1997). While the employer's seniority system had a disparate impact on
plaintiffs who were all fifty-five and older, the scheme had no impact on the "overall
group" of employees forty and over. Id. at 105. The same problem occurred in Mullin
v. Raytheon Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D. Mass. 1998), where the district court found
that despite the employment policy's disparate effects on employees over fifty years
old, the protected class as a whole suffered no damage. Id. at 170-71; Archer, supra
note 22, at 172 n.225.
14G Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1009.
147 Criley, 119 F.3d at 105.
148 See supra note 144.
149 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999); Clemons &
Bales, supra note 27, at 27 n.217.
150 Clemons & Bales, supra note 27, at 27.
151 GREGORY, supra note 1, at 191. Often, however, this positive effect is
countered by "the negative attitude toward age discrimination cases" that has
developed in the judiciary. Id. at 191-93 (noting that often such negative attitudes
exhibited at the trial level reflect the "negative attitude of the justices of the
Supreme Court" to employment discrimination cases generally).
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CONCLUSION
There is a tension underlying this debate. On one hand,
there is a desire to protect employees from discrimination. On
the other, there is a concern for allowing employers to run their
businesses effectively and cost efficiently. The Supreme Court in
Hazen Paper sought to balance these competing factors. The
Court severely limited the bases for an action using disparate
impact theory by declaring that factors that may be related to
age are not necessarily proxies for age. At the same time, the
Court left open the option to use disparate impact theory to
prove that otherwise justifiable business practices could be
pretextual and actually motivated by animus towards older
employees.
While concerns regarding business efficiency and
effectiveness are certainly valid, employees should be allowed to
retain the tool of disparate impact theory. The purposes behind
the ADEA and other employment discrimination legislation,
most notably Title VII, support the use of disparate impact
theory to root out unlawful employment discrimination. Without
such a tool, employees will have no means of attempting to prove
discrimination in cases where employment decisions are
outwardly based on "permissible" factors, such as pension status,
but are in reality a pretext for discriminatory animus.
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